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ABSTRACT
President Obama is faced with a national debt at over $11 trillion and
needs to fund projects such as National Health Care with an ever-shrinking
tax base. As the economy has slowed, so have tax revenues. It would then
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make sense for the government to reexamine tax carve-outs that only benefit
the wealthy. In fact, President Obama is on record saying he wants to eliminate tax loopholes. After almost fifty years, the time is ripe to eliminate
one of the few congressionally authorized tax loopholes—the $30 billion
Exchange Funds.
This Article addresses the social equity arguments and the tax and
economic theories to solve the perceived problem. The Article thoroughly
covers, through unique access to materials not available in traditional legal
sources, including fund private placement memorandum, the basics of fund
details, fund formations, and the tax rules, and suggests solutions to solve
the social inequity.
This Article not only proposes how to create legislation to tax the current arrangements but offers a solution utilizing the Code and Regulations to
tax these vehicles.
INTRODUCTION
One of the longest periods of unchecked corporate and individual
greed and excess has just ended.1 The result of that greed is that our economy has gone through a recession.2 During this past cycle, there has been a
focus on the evils done by “Wall Street” to “Main Street” Americans.3
1. See generally Landon Thomas, Jr., Rich Britons, Offshore and Lightly Taxed,
But Maybe Not Forever, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2009, at B1 (“[M]uch as Stephen A. Schwarzman, the chairman of the Blackstone Group, epitomized Wall Street’s own era of excess.”);
Philipp Meyer, American Excess: A Wall Street Trader Tells All, INDEP. (U.K.), Apr. 27,
2009, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/american-excess--awall-street-trader-tells-all-1674614.html; Dana Milbank, Auto Execs Fly Corporate Jets to
D.C., Tin Cups in Hand, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2008, at A3 (“Instead, the chief executives of
the Big Three automakers opted to fly their company jets to the capital for their hearings this
week before the Senate and House—an ill-timed display of corporate excess for a trio of
executives begging for an additional $25 billion from the public trough this week.”); James
Grant, Op-Ed., The Fed’s Subprime Solution, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/ 2007/08/26/opinion/26grant.html.
2. See generally Robert Creamer, AIG Bonus Scandal Spotlights the Bankruptcy of
Wall Street’s “Greed is Good” Values, HUFFINGTON POST, Mar. 15, 2009,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-creamer/aig-bonus-scandal-spotlig_b_175124.html
(“In 1987 Michael Douglas starred in a film called Wall Street where he famously intoned:
‘Greed is good.’ That has been the motto of the American financial sector for the last thirty
years—and it became the accepted moral frame for much of American economic and political dialogue—culminating in the ‘markets uber alles’ philosophy of the Bush years.”); Nouriel Roubini, Op-Ed., A Global Breakdown of the Recession in 2009, FORBES, Jan. 15, 2009,
available at http://www.forbes.com/2009/01/14/global-recession-2009-oped-cx_nr_0115
roubini.html.
3. Although the current economic crisis has encompassed the collapse of many
institutions, such as Lehman Brothers, and required an unprecedented governmental bail-out
of others, the focus of the corporate greed has been directed at AIG. From the bonuses paid
after the receipt of governmental bail-out money to the lavish corporate outings, AIG has

Fall]

Am I the Only Person Paying Taxes?

505

What has been shown is that there are bundles of benefits or “accumulative
advantage[s]”4 that exist for the wealthy that do not exist for the “average
American” and that do not benefit the greater good. The tax code not only
promotes these advantages, but also helped to fuel the over-consumption
that led to the recent economic downturn.5
There can be no better example of unnecessary benefit without a corollary purpose than “exchange or swap funds.”6 An exchange or swap fund

been a microcosm of the frustration. For information on the collapse of Lehman and other
financials, see Graeme Wearden, David Teather, & Jill Treanor, Banking Crisis: Lehman
Brothers Files for Bankruptcy Protection, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 15, 2008, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/sep/15/lehmanbrothers.creditcrunch; Andrew Ross
Sorkin, Lehman Files for Bankruptcy; Merrill Is Sold, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2008, at B1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/business/15lehman.html?pagewanted=all.
For information on bail-out money to U.S. companies, see Joseph R. Szczesny, The
Auto Bailout Keeps Growing, and Growing, TIME, Jan. 14, 2009, available at
http://www.time. com/time/business/article/0,8599,1871519,00.html; Peter Whoriskey, Under Restructuring, GM to Build More Cars Overseas, WASH. POST, May 8, 2009, at A1.
For information on the AIG corporate outing, see Andrew Taylor, AIG Execs’ Retreat After
Bailout Angers Lawmakers, USA TODAY, Oct. 7, 2008, available at
http://usatoday.com/money/economy/2008-10-07-3811831325_x.htm; AIG, Spa, CHI. TRIB.,
Oct. 8, 2008, available at http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/chi-aig-spa-081008ht,0,460884. story.
For information on AIG bonuses, see Brady Dennis & David Cho, Rage at AIG
Swells as Bonuses Go Out: Fed Decided Payouts Couldn’t Be Stopped, WASH. POST, Mar.
17, 2009, at A1; Jonathan Weisman, Sudeep Reddy & Liam Pleven, Political Heat Sears
AIG: Obama Vows to Block Bonuses, But It May Be Too Late; Firm Pressured to Repay
U.S., WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2009, at A1.
4. MALCOLM GLADWELL, OUTLIERS: THE STORY OF SUCCESS 30 (2008).
5. See Fareed Zakaria, Worthwhile Canadian Initiative, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 16, 2009,
at 31, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/183670.
6. See David Cay Johnston, A Tax Break for the Rich Who Can Keep a Secret,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2002, at C1, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?
res=9E05E2DC1631F933A2575AC0A9649C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=1.
Exchange Funds used to be open to anyone. However, through the amendments, Congress has
limited the investment to qualified investors, specifically, those investors with over
$5,000,000 net worth. Id.
To meet the 1997 requirements, the operators of exchange funds must form
partnerships that are not offered to the general public, only to qualified purchasers.
Other tax and S.E.C. rules require that the partnerships be treated as private placements, rather than a public offering to investors, so no advertising is allowed and
prospective investors must sign confidentiality agreements.
Why limit qualified purchasers to people with $5 million in stocks and bonds?
The rationale is that exchange funds are considered suitable only for people who
do not need to touch the money for 7 to 15 years[—]in short, only for people wealthy enough to afford the risk of such a long-term investment. A lot of early withdrawals make the fund unmanageable.
Id.
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enables investors with over $5 million net worth7 and a large block of a single stock position (most often with a $1 million minimum value), to diversify the position without recognizing gain.8 These exchange or swap funds
are available to the rich—not just the super rich.9 “Fewer than one in 1,900
Americans qualify for exchange funds according to current rules, said Professor Edward Wolff, a New York University expert on wealth.”10
President Obama is on record stating his administration’s position to
crackdown on tax loopholes.11 A logical target would be a $30 billion tax
loophole. Currently, budget estimates are at $3.55 trillion12 and the national
debt is over $12 trillion.13 The time is ripe to examine all tax loopholes—
especially the $30 billion exchange fund tax break.14
7. A shareholder must at the time of the purchase, be a “qualified purchaser” as
defined in Section 2(a)(51)(A) of the 1940 Act and rules thereunder. 15 U.S.C. § 80a2(a)(51)(A) (2006).
8. See Lee Sheppard, Ruby Slippers: Combating Tax-Free Formations of Investment Companies, 84 TAX NOTES 1699, 1699 (1999) [hereinafter Sheppard, Ruby Slippers].
See also Marvin A. Chirelstein, Tax Pooling and Postponement – The Capital Exchange
Funds, 75 YALE L.J. 183 (1965).
9. See Sheppard, Ruby Slippers, supra note 8, at 1699 (“An investor has to have
$10 million worth of shares to even talk to an investment bank about an equity swap. An
investor need only have $1 million in shares to contribute to a swap fund. Swap funds are
sold as private placements to small numbers of investors each of whose total assets exceed
$5 million. Swap funds, therefore, are for mere millionaires, rather than multimillionaires.”).
10. Johnston, supra note 6.
11. See Obama for America, Barack Obama’s Comprehensive Tax Plan,
http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/taxes/Factsheet_Tax_Plan_FINAL.pdf (“Our tax code is
riddled with special interest loopholes that allow some corporations and wealthy individuals
to avoid paying their fair share of taxes.”). See also Kenneth R. Bazinet, President Obama
Takes Aim at Tax Loopholes, Offshore Tax Shelters, May 5, 2009, http://www.nydailynews.
com/news/politics/2009/05/04/2009-05-04_obama_announces_plan_to_close_tax_loopholes
_.html; Lynnley Browning, Obama Plan Leaves One Path to Lower Taxes Wide Open, N.Y.
TIMES, May 5, 2009, at A3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/05/business/
05shelter.html.
12. Roger Runningen & Hans Nichols, Obama Says U.S. Long-Term Debt Load
‘Unsustainable’ (Update2), BLOOMBERG.COM, May 14, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?sid=abXWfVxx_e8w&pid=20603037 (“The White House Office of Management
and Budget also projected next year’s budget will end up at $3.59 trillion, compared with the
$3.55 trillion it estimated previously.”).
13. See Lori Montgomery, Deficit Projected To Swell Beyond Earlier Estimates:
CBO Expects Trillions More in Borrowing, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 2009, at A01, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/20/AR2009032001820.
html?hpid=topnews; U.S. National Debt Clock, http://www.usdebtclock.org/ (last visited
Mar. 30, 2010).
14. See Montgomery, supra note 13 (“Tax collections, meanwhile, would lag well
behind spending, producing huge annual budget deficits that would force the nation to borrow nearly $9.3 trillion over the next decade—$2.3 trillion more than the president predicted
when he unveiled his budget request just one month ago.”); Shira J. Boss, Another Twist for
Exchange Fund Loophole, FORBES, Mar. 20, 2001, http://www.forbes.com/2001/03/20/
0320finance.html (“‘The [proposed] legislation rarely says, “There will be no more exchange
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I. ACCUMULATED ADVANTAGE
The problem facing President Obama in his stated policy of eliminating tax loopholes is twofold. First, Congress has a long history of passing
tax benefits without looking back to determine the applied effects of those
benefits. Second, the modification to existing tax policy is typically reactionary and piecemeal; it is unable to keep up with the technology available
in the financial products marketplace.
It is those who are successful, in other words, who are most likely to be given the
kinds of special opportunities that lead to further success. It’s the rich who get the
biggest tax breaks. It’s the best students who get the best teaching and most attention. And it’s the biggest nine- and ten-year-olds who get the most coaching and
practice. Success is the result of what sociologists like to call “accumulative advantage.”15

There are many who feel that our tax policy tends to promote this accumulated advantage by giving as many tax breaks or incentives to the
wealthy as possible.16 The policy generally is to encourage investment in an

funds,” Dowdall points out. “Instead you get amendments, or changes in the language or the
definitions or the exceptions [that could effectively eliminate them].”’”).
15. GLADWELL, supra note 4, at 30.
16. See Johnston, supra note 6 (“It’s all perfectly legal[—]but only if you have $5
million of stocks and bonds. And only if you promise to keep it secret. It’s one example of
how the tax laws currently grant certain favors only to the very wealthiest.”). For example,
among other items, capital gains are taxed at lower rates than ordinary income. See, e.g.,
JOEL FRIEDMAN & KATHERINE RICHARDS, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, CAPITAL
GAINS AND DIVIDEND TAX CUTS: DATA MAKE CLEAR THAT HIGH-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS
BENEFIT THE MOST 2 (2006), http://www.cbpp.org/files/1-30-06tax2.pdf (“[O]nly [an estimated] 17 percent of households in the bottom 60 percent of the income spectrum own
[some] stock in taxable accounts” while “73 percent of the households in the top 10 percent
of the income spectrum own stock” and the “top one percent owns 29 percent of all taxable
stock.”). Home interest is deductible. See Zakaria, supra note 5 (“[T]he Canadian tax code
does not provide the massive incentive for overconsumption that the U.S. code does: interest
on your mortgage isn’t deductible up north.”). Tax-free exchanges of commercial property
are permitted under § 1031. See Terry Pristin, Commercial Real Estate; Money Flowing to
New Way to Pool Buyers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2004, at C10, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D06E6D61239F931A1575AC0A9629C8B
63 (“Under § 1031 of the federal tax code, such taxes can be deferred if the property being
sold is exchanged for one of the same value. But the seller has to find a new property within
45 days and complete the exchange within 135 days after that—a deadline that sponsors say
is often hard to meet, particularly in a hot real estate market.”); Federation of Exchange
Accommodators, Professional Trade Association for Qualified Intermediaries Under IRC §
1031: FAQs, http://www.1031.org/about1031/faq.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (“The
theory behind Section 1031 is that when a property owner has reinvested the sale proceeds
into another property, the economic gain has not been realized in a way that generates funds
to pay any tax. In other words, the taxpayer’s investment is still the same, only the form has
changed (e.g. vacant land exchanged for apartment building). Therefore, it would be unfair
to force the taxpayer to pay tax on a ‘paper’ gain.”).

508

Michigan State Law Review

[Vol. 2009:503

area that Congress deems to be beneficial.17 It is accepted that tax policy
that favors an investor class or a corporation is permissible because it benefits the greater economic good. One such advantage granted is the tax-free
diversification commonly called exchange or swap funds, which was never
enacted with the purpose of benefiting the greater economic good.18
Even if there is a greater economic good, it has been eloquently argued numerous times that providing this accumulated advantage through the
tax code does not provide a greater good.19 One problem in analyzing tax
policy is the lack of follow-up research to determine whether or not the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (Code), is accomplishing its
stated goals.20 Often, it is the initial stated assumption that rules the day.21
For example, the assumption with capital gains tax is that it will encourage
investment by middle-class Americans even though this has been proven
untrue.22 More often than not, the applied results will greatly diverge.23

17. For example, “clarinet and music lessons” are deductible. See Linda Stern,
Deduction Redux: Six Tax Breaks You’ve Probably Never Heard Of, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 7,
2009, http://www.newsweek.com/id/192900?from=rss.
18. Generally, in a swap or exchange fund a single stock position is contributed to a
partnership with other single stock positions. At the end of a term the contributor receives
back a diversified portfolio of positions. See Johnston, supra note 6; Boss, supra note 14.
This Article does not address the reporting rules under Rule 144, Section 16 or 13(d) of the
Exchange Act. The funds leave it up to the shareholder whether this constitutes a disposal
worth reporting on schedule 13D or 13G filings. See Beldore Capital Fund LLC, SUMMARY
OF THE TERMS OF THE OFFERING 54 (2007) [hereinafter Beldore].
19. See, for example, discussions centered around the home interest deduction for a
home owner’s mortgage. In a recent article by Mr. Fareed Zakaria in Newsweek, he posited
that there is no actual correlation between the tax benefit and home ownership. He compared
Canada’s taxing system to the United States regarding home interest deductibility. In Canada, interest is not deductible while it is in the United States. Zakaria, supra note 5 (“Ah, but
you’ve heard American politicians wax eloquent on the need for these expensive programs—
interest deductibility alone costs the federal government $100 billion a year—because they
allow the average Joe to fulfill the American Dream of owning a home. Sixty-eight percent
of Americans own their own homes. And the rate of Canadian homeownership? It’s 68.4
percent.”).
20. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN & RICHARDS, supra note 16 (“There is little evidence, however, that these tax cuts have had a positive impact on the stock market. A recent study by
three Federal Reserve economists found that these tax cuts did not raise the value of U.S.
stocks. Similarly, an analysis by the Urban Institute-Brookings Institution Tax Policy Center
found that capital gains tax rates and stock market values have been only weakly correlated
over time.”).
21. See, e.g., Sheppard, Ruby Slippers, supra note 8, at 1699 (“[Rep.] Neal’s bill
also asks the larger question of why listed securities should ever pass tax-free in a section
351 transfer.”).
22. See supra note 16.
23. See, e.g., Gene Amromin, Paul Harrison & Steven Sharpe, How Did the 2003
Dividend Tax Cut Affect Stock Prices? 1 (Divs. of Research & Statistics & Monetary Affairs,
Fed. Reserve Bd., Paper No. 2005-61, 2006), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
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The purpose of this Article is not to attack the decisions of Congress
to promote investment or other socioeconomic goals. Rather, there are portions of the Code that appear at odds with the stated policy of Congress.24
This often occurs when the Code has been applied to structures to which it
was not intended.25 In the tax vernacular, this type of application is often
referred to as “tax shelters” or “tax loopholes.” When structures are established specifically to avoid a Code section, with tax avoidance as their primary motivation, they are universally attacked by Congress and the Internal
Revenue Service (Service).26
When unintended consequences occur from an intended structure, the
resulting anomaly is often cleared up with either legislation or rulings by the
Service.27 Perhaps, Congress should have enacted a “subjective” Code provision that merely stated that if the tax structure provided the economic
benefit of diversification, it is taxable. This is similar to the subjective approach used by the “economic substance” criteria. However, what happens
when the anomaly is not corrected but rather acquiesced to?28 In the case of
pubs/feds/2005/200561/200561pap.pdf (concluding that there was no finding of “any imprint
of the dividend tax cut news on the value of the aggregate U.S. stock market”).
24. The Service has promoted various theories to attack these anomalies. For example, the “economic substance doctrine” is used as a counter argument when the form of the
transaction meets the rules but the substance of the transaction is lacking. See, e.g., Gregory
v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469-70 (1935); Joseph Bankman, Articles and Essays: The Economic Substance Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 5 (2000).
25. The tax shelters that unwound during the Enron period illustrate this point, including the famous “Son of Boss” transactions. In the “Son of Boss” transaction, an assets
basis would be augmented through the partnership tax rules. See John D. McKinnon & Jeff
D. Opdyke, What Enron Means for Your Tax Return: IRS Crackdown Turns to Individuals in
Wake of Accounting Scandals; Here’s How to Respond, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 2002, at D1,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1018304490631111160.html (“Clearly, the IRS
is saying ‘We know you’ve been playing games,’ and now they’re out to stop it.” (statement
of tax attorney Stefan Tucker)). See also Press Release, IRS, Treasury Issues Guidance on
Partnership Abuses (June 23, 2003), http://www.treas.gov/press/ releases/js493.htm (discussing the “Son of Boss” transactions).
26. See Sheppard, Ruby Slippers, supra note 8, at 1700 (“Greene Street’s, uh, investment objectives show the overwhelming tax-avoidance motive of its formation.”). See
also Beldore, supra note 18.
27. For example, the IRS publishes lists of Abusive and Listed Transactions on their
web site. IRS, Recognized Abusive and Listed Transactions, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/
corporations/article/0,,id=120633,00.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2010). This is also a compilation of the most aggressive tax shelters. See generally McKinnon & Opdyke, supra note
25.
28. Boss, supra note 14 (“Technically, exchange funds should be illegal. There is a
law preventing people from exchanging one security for a like security without paying taxes.
There is also a general rule prohibiting investors from contributing securities to a partnership—which is what an exchange fund is—in exchange for shares in the partnership when
the whole purpose is stock diversification.”). For example, in I.R.S. Notice 2001- 45, 200133 I.R.B. 129 (Aug. 13, 2001), a similar basis shifting conceptual structure was disallowed
by the Service. In the notice, the Service identified certain redemptions of stock in transac-
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exchange or swap funds, there has been over fifty years of acquiescence.
When a correction was proposed to this anomaly,29 the Joint Committee on
Taxation stated that the rich would just find another way to avoid the tax30—
a rather strange position for the Committee to take.
II. EXCHANGE FUND BASICS
In our current economic environment, one would not think that a diversification technique employed since the 1930s would be important.
However, the current downturn of the market has created an environment in
which techniques that historically were viewed as neutral or good are now
favored.31 In reality, the downturn in the market has opened the market for
tions not subject to U.S. tax in which the basis of the redeemed stock is purported to shift to a
U.S. taxpayer as “listed transactions.” Id.
29. Sheppard, Ruby Slippers, supra note 8, at 1699 (“[A] bill, H.R. 2705, [was introduced] to further amend section 351, this time in a broader way than has been done in the
past, to combat tax-free formation of swap funds. Neal’s bill also asks the larger question of
why listed securities should ever pass tax-free in a section 351 transfer.”).
30. Johnston, supra note 6, at C4 (“The Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation,
without any supporting data, has written Mr. Neal to say that no revenue would be raised by
closing exchange funds because ‘the class of investors engaging in swap funds’ would find
other ways to avoid the tax.”).
31. See Sheppard, Ruby Slippers, supra note 8, at 1699 (“In spite of, or perhaps
because of, the warning signs of a market downturn, the formation of swap funds and the
avoidance of gain recognition on the contribution of appreciated securities has continued
apace.”); Walter Updegrave, Danger: High Levels of Company Stock: Owning Your Employer’s Shares in Your 401(k) Is a Huge Threat to Your Retirement. Keep it to a Minimum,
MONEY MAG., Jan. 8, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/01/07/pf/expert/company
_stock.moneymag/index.htm (“The problem is that once you get beyond a small holding of
company stock—or the shares of any one company for that matter—you dramatically increase the riskiness of your portfolio in two ways. First, you expose yourself to the possibility that your company may simply implode along the lines of Bear Stearns and Lehman
Brothers, decimating the stock’s value (and your 401(k)’s balance along with it) virtually
overnight. But even if that doesn’t happen, there’s another risk: heightened volatility. A
single stock is typically two to three times more volatile than a diversified portfolio.”);
Shlomo Benartzi with Richard H. Thaler, Using Behavioral Economics to Improve Diversification in 401(k) Plans: Solving the Company Stock Problem, UCLA ANDERSON SCH. OF
MGMT, http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/x8065.xml (last visited Feb. 26, 2010) (“In the case of
company stock, overconfidence could also be exacerbated by a ‘familiarity bias.’ When we
know more about a company, we are more comfortable investing in that company, even if we
have no real private information that would provide an investment advantage. . . . Many
investors fail to realize that the investment performance of a single stock is much riskier than
that of a diversified portfolio.”); Paul J. Lim, Diversify! Diversify! (Yes, Even Now), N.Y.
TIMES,
Dec.
7,
2008,
at
BU7,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com
/2008/12/07/business/yourmoney/07fund.html (“Only over time does diversification really
show its worth. For example, over the 10 years through November, the S.& P. 500 lost almost 1 percent a year, on average. But a diversified portfolio of 40 percent S.& P. 500
stocks, 25 percent foreign shares in the MSCI EAFE index, 25 percent in fixed-income securities found in the Barclays Capital U.S. Aggregate Bond Index, and 10 percent in Trea-
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the exchange fund industry.32 For example, in the middle of one of the
worst times to invest in United States history, Eaton Vance closed another
exchange fund in October 2008.33
“When most Americans sell stock they must pay taxes on their profits
by the following April 15.”34 Exchange funds are sold to the wealthy as a
means to diversify a single stock position without realizing current tax on
that position.35 Investors will receive immediate diversification of their po-

sury bills gained nearly 2 percent annually, on average, according to T. Rowe Price.”); Jane
Bryant Quinn, Diversify Your Investments Even If It Hurts: Jane Bryant Quinn,
BLOOMBERG.COM, Apr. 22, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?sid=aX44el0YV2
xk&pid=20601212 (“The best way to minimize your risk of investment loss is to own assets
with low or negative correlations.”); Alan R. Feld, High Exposure To Low-Basis Stock: Too
Much of a Good Thing?, CPA J., Nov. 1999, at 60, available at
http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/d601199a.html (“Since even a ‘typical’ stock—a stock
with an average arithmetic return close to the market’s—misses out on the smoothing effect
of diversification, it’s likely to underperform the market as a whole. In fact (Table 1[]),
between 1970 and the end of 1998, a $1 million investment in the average single stock was
sufficiently volatile to fall $18 million short of a market portfolio over the 29-year period.
Furthermore, this heightened volatility is exacerbated when the investment environment is
more difficult than usual. The longer the bad patch, the more poorly the average stock is
likely to perform relative to the market.”). See generally Robert S. Bloink, Premium Financed Surprises: Cancellation of Indebtedness Income and Financed Life Insurance, 62
TAX LAW (forthcoming Spring 2010) (manuscript on file with the author).
32. See Sheppard, Ruby Slippers, supra note 8, at 1702 (“Congress can take comfort
in the fact that like many troublesome transactions, the swap fund transfer is a bull market
transaction. When the bear comes, there will have to be statutes to prevent the selective
recognition, transmutation, and preservation of capital losses.”).
33. Another example would be EBX IV, L.P., which closed at the end of 2008 with
twenty-eight companies. EB Exchange Funds Home Page, http://www.ebexchangefunds.com
(last visited Feb. 26, 2010) [hereinafter EB Exchange Funds].
34. Johnston, supra note 6, at C1.
35. See, e.g., Sheppard, Ruby Slippers, supra note 8, at 1700; Beldore, supra note
18, at 3; Citigroup Alternative Investments, http://www.smithbarney.com/products_services/
managed_money/cai/types.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2010) (“Exchange funds allow investors a tax-free means to diversify a low-cost-basis and/or restricted stock position. Exchange
funds allow investors to pool their low-cost-basis stocks in a fund. In exchange for contributing their stock to the fund, each investor owns a pro-rata share of the fund. After a set
period of time—generally seven years—investors can redeem their interest in the fund. They
will receive a non-taxable, distribution of a diversified pool of stock from the fund’s portfolio. The value of this distribution is equal to the net asset value of their pro-rata interest in
the fund at the time of the distribution. The stock distributed from the fund will retain in the
aggregate the low cost basis of the stock originally contributed to the fund. There is always
the possibility that the U.S. tax code could change, disallowing the favorable tax treatment of
exchange funds. These changes could be retroactive, although this is believed to be unlikely.”); Wilmington Trust, Single Stock Diversification Strategies, http://www.wilmingtontrust
.com/wtcom/index.jsp?fileid=3000192 (last visited Feb. 26, 2010) (“The goal of an exchange
fund is to allow an investor to shift from a concentrated position to a diversified position
without triggering capital gains tax, as would be the case if the investor simply sold shares.”).
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sitions.36 At the end of seven years, that investor will receive a bundle of
securities with the same cost basis as the single stock position he or she
contributed to the fund.37 Further, it is arguable whether this contribution is
subject to the reporting rules, such as Rule 144.38
Nonetheless, how large could this small carve-out actually be? The
largest Eaton Vance fund has over $16 billion under management.39 A
transformation of the law would have a minimum tax impact of over $3
billion on this fund alone.40 However, there are similar funds at JP Morgan,
Bessemer Trust, and Goldman Sachs, among a few.41
An interesting part of the discussion is the purported application of
Sections 351 and 721 of the Code, discussed infra, to exchange fund forma-

36. See Johnston, supra note 6, at C4 (“The confidential offering provided to The
Times shows that investors have contributed to Eaton Vance’s exchange funds pool shares of
more than 700 corporations, including almost every company in the Standard & Poor’s
500.”); Boss, supra note 14.
37. See Boss, supra note 14 (“Seven years later, all the investors could withdraw a
basket of stocks from the fund without paying capital gains.”); Johnston, supra note 6, at C1
(“If investors stay in the pool for seven years, the stocks they get when they withdraw their
investment do not incur the tax on investment profits that other investors must pay. Only if
the investors then sell the various stocks they received from the pool are they supposed to
pay taxes.”); Toddi Gutner, Time to Swap ‘n’ Save? Exchange Funds Can Postpone Your
Tax Bill, BUS. WK., Aug. 9, 1999, at 100, available at http://www.businessweek.com/1999/
99_32/b3641125.htm.
38. See Johnston, supra note 6, at C4 (“One of these people said he was also upset
by advice in promotional literature for the Eaton Vance funds that shows executives how to
disclose these transactions in a way that is legal but that investors who track sales by company executives are less likely to notice.”).
39. See id. (“The Eaton Vance mutual fund company in Boston and the Goldman
Sachs investment house are by far the biggest operators of investment pools based on this tax
avoidance technique, with at least $18 billion of stocks in what are known in the investment
business as exchange funds or swap funds.”); Boss, supra note 14 (estimating that in 2001,
“more than $20 billion [was] tied up in exchange funds, according to industry accounts.
Bessemer Trust’s four funds alone house[d] over $1 billion of individual investors’ stocks”).
See also Ari Weinberg, Founders Get a Cure for the IPO Blues, FORBES, Sept. 13, 2002,
available at http://www.Forbes.com/2002/09/13/0913funds.html.
40. The current long capital gains tax rates in 2009 is 15%. See Section 112 of the
Code.
41. See Johnston, supra note 6, at C4 (“Smaller exchange funds are operated by
investment firms that include the Bessemer Trust, Credit Suisse First Boston, Merrill Lynch
and the Salomon Smith Barney brokerage unit of Citigroup.”); Boss, supra note 14 (“Several
major investment companies have orchestrated these funds, including JP Morgan (nyse: JPM
- news - people), Goldman Sachs (nyse: GS - news - people), Eaton Vance (nyse: EV - news
- people), Salomon Smith Barney, a unit of Citigroup (nyse: C - news - people), and Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette, a unit of Credit Suisse First Boston. ‘It’s clearly targeting a certain
profile of investor—that being the wealthiest,’ Henderson says. Typically investors contribute a minimum of $1 million in appreciated stock, which represents 10% to 20% of their
holding.”); Gutner, supra note 37.
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tion.42 As anyone who remembers basic income tax can attest to, the utilization of these nonrecognition statutes43 is surprising in light of basic income
tax principles.44 A typical Section 351 or 721 transaction is “a relatively
small-volume transaction involving either the incorporation of an existing
business by its owners or[, most commonly,] the establishment of a new
business by a limited number of individuals desiring to combine their capital and skills.”45 The basic tax principle that applies to the contributions in
these small start-up businesses is viewed as a mere change in form of conducting operations of holding property.46
For a shareholder to achieve the diversification that an exchange fund
achieves, almost by definition, requires numerous shareholders since all
shareholders are contributing single-stock positions. Exchange fund formations involve hundreds of shareholders.47 In an exchange fund, each shareholder “in exchange for one or a few appreciated securities, obtains a fractional interest in a large diversified portfolio of which his former property is
but a small part.”48 Most concerning is that these individuals are the wealthiest people who are not truly in need of this benefit.49
Moreover, the participants in an exchange fund are “brought together—perhaps ‘assembled’ is the better term—not by virtue of acquaintance,
business contact or other element of previous association, but as a result of

42. BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, 4 FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 91.2.2 (3d ed. 2003) (“This rule [351] is intended to preclude tax-free
diversifications of investments by swap-fund exchange plans . . . .”).
43. A basic discussion of tax principles will be helpful in understanding nonrecognition. The general rule is that a change in form of ownership of property will trigger tax. You
will both realize the gain or loss and recognize the tax effects. The Code provides several
exceptions to this rule. Although the gain is realized, the taxpayer does not recognize the
gain or loss for tax purposes. Some common nonrecognition statutes are § 1031 for like-kind
real estate transfers and the rules subject to this article.
44. Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 190.
45. Id. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(c)(7), Example (2) (as amended in 1996) (51
transferors of mixed bag of stocks treated as diversification); Rev. Rul. 99-5, 1999-1 C.B.
434.
46. This is commonly referred to as the aggregate view of partnership or corporate
taxation.
47. For example, the Beldore fund anticipated over 100 shareholders. See Beldore,
supra note 18, at 78.
48. Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 190.
49. Under the Investment Company Act, the shareholder has to be a qualified investor with over $5 million and shares must be offered to only accredited investors as defined in
Rule 501(a) of Regulation D of the Security Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(51)(A) (2006)
(noting that a qualified purchaser is defined as (i) any natural person who owns $5,000,000
or more in investments, (ii) any company that owns $5,000,00 or more in investments, (iii)
any trust).

514

Michigan State Law Review

[Vol. 2009:503

solicitation by promoters, brokers or fund management companies.”50 Then
there is the issue of day-to-day control. “[T]he investors lack day-to-day
control over management” activities and, of course, “have no individual
management responsibilities” since the fund is held by thousands of investors.51 In discussions regarding the intended uses of Section 351, a small,
related shareholder group and active shareholder participation are normally
referenced.52 However, these characteristics are missing in the formation of
an exchange fund.53
III. TRADITIONAL FUND STRUCTURE
Exchange funds were not the result of a specific grant of legislative
authority. Rather, they were “an accidental development—that is, an accident of skillful planning—and not the product of a conscious legislative
determination to extend relief to investors ‘who feel prevented from diversifying because of what they consider to be the excessive tax cost of selling
appreciated assets.’”54 Therefore, the first question is: how are these funds
traditionally structured. This is especially important because the tax effects
that result are a derivative of the form of the fund.
An exchange fund is generally formed, by a promoter, as a Delaware
limited liability corporation.55 The limited liability interests in the fund are
divided into shares.56 The management, control, and operation of the fund
are the exclusive responsibility of the manager of the fund.57 The fund is
managed by a board of directors that generally appoints an Investment Advisor.58
Shareholders have limited rights regarding their interest in the fund.59
Often, the shareholders do not have the right to replace the promoter as the
50. Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 190; See also BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, at
¶ 91.2.2 (“[N]umerous unrelated individuals, solicited and selected by a promoter, transfer
appreciated securities to a newly organized investment company in exchange for its stock.”).
51. Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 190; see also Beldore, supra note 18, at 1.
52. Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 190.
53. Id. See also BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.2.
54. Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 185 (quoting Prospectus of Centennial Management
and Research Corp. 3 (Dec. 23, 1960)).
55. See, e.g., Beldore, supra note 18, at 55.
56. Unlike a traditional small corporation strategy envisioned by Congress, “the
[f]und may issue an unlimited number of full and fractional [s]hares.” Id.
57. Compare this structure to the initial nonrecognition provisions under Section
351(e) as enacted. See infra Part IV. Generally speaking, nonrecognition treatment was
proper when, immediately after the contribution, the persons transferring the stock were in
control of the corporation. See Monte A. Jackel & James B. Sowell, Transfers to Investment
Corporations: Complexity in a Conundrum, TAX NOTES 1659, 1660 (2002).
58. In the case of Beldore, the Investment Advisor is Boston Management and Research, a wholly owned subsidiary of Eaton Vance. Beldore, supra note 18, at 58.
59. See Beldore, supra note 18, at 55; Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 190.
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manager of the fund.60 Additionally, shareholders have limited rights to (i)
“consent to . . . changes in the investment objective[s] and the fundamental
investment [goals] of the [f]und”; (ii) designate a new investment manager
if the initial investment goes bankrupt and the initial promoter does not appoint a successor; (iii) commence a shareholder derivative suit brought by a
shareholder; (iv) voluntarily terminate the fund in the event that assets under
management drop below a predetermined threshold; and (v) appoint a liquidator.61 The most telling statement related to the shareholder rights is as
follows from the Beldore fund prospectus, “[s]hareholders will have no
right to vote on, consent to or approve any action or matter relating to the
fund.”62 In sum, shareholders are wholly passive investors in the fund.
Since all decisionmaking authority vests in the manager, the manager
of the limited liability company will play a crucial role. The manager is
always the promoter of the fund.63 The manager generally will turn over the
investment decisions to the Investment Advisor.
The Investment Advisor will hold two important roles. The first role
is as gatekeeper for the fund.64 He or she will decide which securities are
worthy of being part of the fund. The second role will be, after formation
and close of the fund, as portfolio manager.65 He or she will decide when
and if any of the securities will need to be sold and if any investment techniques66 will be employed by the fund.
Moreover, the manager charges significant investment management
fees.67 The fees charged have two components: (1) the initial fee and (2) the
annual fees. Generally, these fees range from 1-2% of gross assets.68
It is a two-step process to be accepted into the fund. First, the investor
must meet the initial vetting of the fund manager. Then the investor must
meet the vetting of the other investors.
60. See Beldore, supra note 18, at 55; Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 190.
61. See Beldore, supra note 18, at 55; Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 190.
62. Beldore, supra note 18, at 55.
63. In the case of Beldore, the Manager is Eaton Vance. Id. at 55.
64. See, e.g, id. at 5.
65. See, e.g, id.
66. Investment techniques include a plethora of derivative trading techniques. Beldore includes, for example:
using hedging techniques such as the purchase of put options, equity collars (combining the purchase of put options and the sale of call options on the same equity
securities), equity swaps, short sales of individual securities held, short sales of index or basket securities whose constituents are held in whole or in part, forward
sales of stocks held and the sale of futures contracts on stocks and stock indices
and options thereon.
Id. at 2.
67. See, e.g, id. at 15.
68. See, e.g, id. at 14-15. They charge 60 bps plus a service fee of 25 bps plus transfer agent fees. Id. at 15.
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Generally, the process for vetting securities is as follows. The investor will speak with the promoter and describe the securities.69 The promoter
will then discuss with the Investment Advisor whether those securities meet
the investment guidelines of the fund.70 The securities will also generally
come from the big three exchanges (e.g., NYSE, AMEX, NASDAQ) with
minimum share pricing and capitalization.71 If they are of the class of securities the Investment Advisor desires to balance the portfolio, then the fund
will circulate the prospectus to the investor.72 Often, funds have a general
theme.73 For example, in the 1990s there were funds for technology IPO
offerings74 or there were high-tech funds.75
If the securities meet the first test of acceptance by the Investment
Advisor, then the shareholder will place the securities with an escrow agent
“pending the exchange of the securities for [s]hares” in the fund.76 The securities must meet the criteria of the other investors. Before the fund officially closes, there is an inspection period of generally three to five days
after a list of the securities and other investments is circulated among the

69. See, e.g, id. at 34.
70. See, e.g, id. But cf. Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 187 (noting that the acceptable
securities were “included in the fund’s prospectus”).
71. For example, Beldore requires stock price to be at least $10.00 with “an equity
market capitalization of at least $500 million.” Beldore, supra note 18, at 5, 34.
72. See, e.g., Beldore, supra note 18, at 5 (“Equity securities proposed for contribution to the Fund will be evaluated by the Investment Advisor and accepted or rejected based
primarily upon the Investment Adviser’s view of how acceptance of such securities would
affect the Fund’s ability to achieve its investment objective.”); EB Exchange Funds, supra
note 33 (“EB will review hundreds of companies before accepting stock of about 25 companies into a fund.”).
73. David A. Twibell, Understanding Exchange Funds, FIN. ADVISOR, Nov. 2004,
available at http://www.fa-mag.com/component/content/article/992.html?magazineID=1&
issue=49&Itemid=73 (“‘Some funds, like Eaton Vance’s Belterra Fund, focus on building a
portfolio of well-known large-cap stocks, while others like Merrill Lynch’s Montvale Fund
lean more toward the mid-cap market.’ says Blake Flood, vice-president of investments at
Atlanta-based Consolidated Planning Corp., an affiliate of Raymond James Financial Services. ‘Other funds try to track major stock indices such as the Standard & Poor’s 500 or the
Nasdaq 100.’”).
74. See Weinberg, supra note 39; EB Exchange Funds, supra note 33 (explaining
that EB Exchange Funds create partnerships that enable entrepreneurs who are Accredited
Investors to pool their pre-IPO stock).
75. See, e.g., White v. Alex Brown Mgmt. Servs., No. D049385, 2008 WL 324739,
at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2008). White was one of the original founders and President of
Qualcomm and contributed his highly appreciated stock to the DB Alexander Brown Exchange Fund I. Id. When the Fund closed it had eighty-eight partners who contributed
$152.5 million of securities. Id. See generally Cabaniss v. Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc., 611
S.E.2d 878 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
76. See Beldore, supra note 18, at 7.
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prospective investors.77 During this inspection period, prospective investors
can withdraw their subscriptions.78
The exchange fund units will usually be redeemable at any time.79 If
the redemption occurs within the first seven years following the contribution to the fund, the securities that the investor contributed will be distributed.80 At the end of seven years, a basket of securities will be distributed
to the investor.81
Despite the promises of the fund managers, investors maintain risk
within the funds. In the late 1990s, exchange funds were quite popular
among the tech industry.82 Alex Brown was one of the largest purveyors of
funds. At close of the fourth incarnation of the fund, eighty-eight investors
contributed more than ninety different securities valued at over $150 million.83 However, several years later, the value of the fund dropped substantially.84 The problem that arose for the fund manager was the inability to
protect against this downside risk. In most funds, the managers set up the
77. See, e.g., id. (stating that the inspection period is “close of business on the third
business day after distribution to Subscribers of the Inspection Report.”). But see Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 187-88 (describing an inspection period of three weeks: “The ‘preliminary report’ permits the depositor to form a judgment concerning the investment merits of
the portfolio, and he may (without cost) withdraw the securities deposited by him on notification to the depository at any time within a period of three weeks following receipt of the
report.”).
78. See, e.g., Beldore, supra note 18, at 7.
79. Section 704(c)(1)(B) of the Code provides that if appreciated securities contributed by a partner are distributed within seven years after the date of contribution to anyone
other than the contributing partner, the contributing partner will generally recognize a gain in
the year of the distribution. I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(B) (2006). See Chirelstein, supra note 8, at
189; Beldore, supra note 18, at 10.
80. See I.R.C. §§ 704 (c)(1)(B), 737 (2006). See also Beldore, supra note 18, at 86
(“To avoid the recognition of taxable gains by Investors in the Portfolio that have contributed
securities to the Portfolio (including the Company), the Portfolio will not distribute appreciated securities contributed by an Investor in the Portfolio to another Investor in the Portfolio during the first seven years following contribution of the securities unless the contributing
Investor in the Portfolio has withdrawn from the Portfolio. Similarly, the Company will not
distribute securities contributed by an Investor in the Company (including the Fund) to
another Investor in the Company during the first seven years after contribution of the securities unless the contributing Investor in the Company has withdrawn from the Company. And
further, the Fund will not distribute securities contributed by a Shareholder to another Shareholder during the first seven years following contribution of the securities unless the contributing Shareholder has withdrawn from the Fund.”); id. at 10 (explaining that there will also
be a termination penalty around one percent depending on the fund).
81. See Beldore, supra note 18, at 11.
82. Weinberg, supra note 39 (“Developed by San Francisco-based EB Financial
Group, an exchange fund is essentially a private-equity fund exclusively for founders.”).
83. White v. Alex Brown Mgmt. Servs., No. D049385, 2008 WL 324739, at *1
(Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2008); Cabaniss v. Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc., 611 S.E.2d 878, 879-80
(N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
84. White, 2008 WL 324739, at *1; Cabaniss, 611 S.E.2d at 880.
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funds with collars85 to “limit the upside and downside” potentials of the
fund.86 However, in the early years of the fund, the appreciation of certain
positions caused the renewal price of the collars to be excessive.87 The
managers made the decision to remove the collars and capture that initial
gain.88 Ultimately, the stocks experienced a sharp decline and, without the
collar, a majority of the value of the exchange fund was lost.89
IV. TAX HISTORY OF EXCHANGE FUNDS
Exchange funds have been in existence for decades, but came into the
limelight in the 1960s.90 The statutes regulating exchange funds have been
revised and reexamined by Congress through the years, but the tacit consent
of the investment vehicle has nonetheless survived.91 In order to understand
the current rules and carve-outs, it is important to briefly cover the evolutionary saga of the current Code sections. The trigger that allows exchange
funds to operate is the application of the nonrecognition treatment of either
Section 351 or 721 of the Code to the contribution of the securities to the
fund.92 There are six main legislative periods that need to be addressed: (i)
85. Albert v. Alex Brown Mgmt. Servs., No. Civ.A. 762-N, Civ.A. 763-N, 2005 WL
2130607, at *5 n.17 (Del. Ch. Aug. 26, 2005) (“‘Collaring’ is financial jargon for purchasing
offsetting calls and puts on a security to limit upside and downside exposure. At the inception of the Funds, the Managers attempted to limit upside and downside exposure to roughly
10%.”).
86. Id.
87. Id. at *5.
88. Id. “The Managers then made the decision to remove the collars on the Funds, a
decision that had beneficial effects in the short-term . . . .” Id.
89. Id. at *5-6.
90. See Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 185; Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1659;
Lee A. Sheppard, Rationalizing the Taxation of Exchange Funds, 95 TAX NOTES 152 (2002)
[hereinafter Sheppard, Rationalizing].
91. See Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1659 (“The first anti-swap fund legislation was enacted in 1966 to address corporate exchange funds. . . . The swap fund saga
continued its evolutionary pace in 1976 when, due to the removal of the non-tax impediments to the use of partnerships, the partnership exchange fund came into vogue. . . . [T]wo
decades later, in 1997, . . . the investment company statute was significantly expanded . . .
.”); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE
PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2001 BUDGET PROPOSAL 361
(Comm. Print 2000) (“Congress has been aware of swap funds and has enacted legislation on
several occasions to curtail their availability.”).
92. See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.2; Chirelstein, supra note 8, at
184 (“Although the securities exchanged have substantially appreciated in value in the hands
of the individual investors, the exchange is claimed to be non-taxable to the investors owing
to the presumed applicability of Internal Revenue Code section 351 . . . .”); Sheppard, Rationalizing, supra note 90, at 152; Sheppard, Ruby Slippers, supra note 8, at 1699 (“Once again,
the section 351(e) and section 721(b) limitations on the tax-free formation of investment
companies have proved ineffectual and easily avoidable.”); Jerome M. Hesch & Elliot Man-
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pre-1966; (ii) the 1966 investment company statute and accompanying regulations; (iii) the 1976 partnership legislation; (iv) the 1980 proposed regulations; (v) the 1996 regulations; and (vi) the 1997 statutory amendment. The
first two periods deal with the nonrecognition provisions regarding corporations. The last four periods deal with both corporation and partnership nonrecognition. However, it should be noted that very few, if any, funds are
currently structured as corporations.93 Most funds go out of the way to ensure that they will be treated as partnerships for tax purposes.94
A. Pre-1966 Section 351(a)
Section 351(a) of the Code provides that “[n]o gain or loss shall be
recognized if property is transferred to a corporation by one or more persons
solely in exchange for stock in such corporation and immediately after the
exchange such person or persons are in control . . . of the corporation.”95
Prior to 1966, investors would contribute appreciated stock to a company
and utilize Section 351 for nonrecognition.96 In 1960, the Service issued a
series of rulings that granted nonrecognition treatment under Section 351.97
The Service ruled that upon the transfer of appreciated stock to an investment corporation, nonrecognition treatment would be applicable if the transferees were in control of the corporation post transfer.98
As discussed above,99 the application of Section 351 to an arrangement
that allows investors to obtain tax-free diversification does not appear to be
a clean fit.100 Section 351 is traditionally applied to a start-up business.101 It

ning, Partnership Investment Company Rules for Family Limited Partnerships, 22 TAX
MGM’T EST. GIFTS & TR. J. 200, 200 (1997).
93. See Beldore, supra note 18, at 78 (“Were the Fund, the Company or the Portfolio to be treated as a corporation rather than as a partnership for tax purposes, its income
would be subject to federal corporate income tax at a current maximum rate of 35%. In
addition, distributions to Investors (or Shareholders, in the case of the Fund) would be characterized as dividends or otherwise treated as corporate distributions, and there would be no
flow-through of items of income, gain, loss and deduction to Investors or Shareholders.”).
94. See, e.g., id (“The tax aspects discussed below depend, in large part, on the
determination that the Fund, the Company and the Portfolio will be partnerships rather than
corporations for federal income tax purposes.”).
95. I.R.C. § 351(a) (2006). See also Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1660.
96. See Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 190-91; Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at
1660.
97. See, e.g., I.R.S. Tech. Info. Release 303 (Feb. 9, 1961); I.R.S. Tech. Info. Release 312 (Mar. 13, 1961); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 6205236350A (May 23, 1962); I.R.S. Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 6104106310A (Apr. 10, 1961); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 6103249060A (Mar. 24, 1961).
See also Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1660; Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 186.
98. Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1660.
99. See supra Part IV.
100. See Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 184-85,190.
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is generally accepted that the rules in Section 351 are contemplated to apply
where a few shareholders would start a business and contribute capital to
the business.102 But by 1961, exchange or swap fund promoters were applying these rules to transactions involving thousands of shareholders who
were assembled by a promoter.103 Moreover, these shareholders were turning over control of the corporation to the promoters and no longer managing
the corporation on a day-to-day basis.104 These promoters were buoyed by
the availability of IRS rulings substantiating their tax position and by the
ceasing of IRS rulings either for or against the proposition.105
In 1961, it had become evident106 that exchange funds were, in the
Service’s view, an unintended consequence. Thus, the Service issued a “no
rule” position in Revenue Procedure 62-32.107 The Service was cautious to
confine the applicability of its “no rule” position to transactions involving
exchanges of securities or shares to newly formed investment companies
“as a result of solicitation by promoters, brokers or investment houses.”108
The Service’s interpretation of Section 351 appears to have applicability
only to corporate formations where there was a prior association.109
101. See id. at 190 (“What is undoubtedly conceived of as typical of section 351 is a
relatively small-volume transaction involving either the incorporation of an existing business
by its owners or the establishment of a new business by a limited number of individuals
desiring to combine their capital and skills.”); BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.1
(describing Section 351 transaction as formation of a joint venture); BITTKER & LOKKEN,
supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.2 (“Section 351 does not apply to a ‘transfer of property to an investment company.’”).
102. See Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 190.
103. See id.; Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1660.
104. See Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 190; BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, at ¶
91.2.2; see generally I.R.S. Tech. Info. Release 303 (Feb. 9, 1961).
105. See Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 190; Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1660;
BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.2; see generally I.R.S. Tech. Info. Release 303
(Feb. 9, 1961).
106. Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 191 (“The suspicion [of misapplication of section
351] grows stronger by reason of the circumstantial resemblance between fund formations
and what former Commissioner Caplin has called an ordinary ‘marketplace exchange of
securities.’” (citing Mortimer M. Caplin, Taxpayer Rulings Policy of the Internal Revenue
Service: A Statement of Principles, 20 INST. ON FED. TAX’N 1, 23 (1962))).
107. Rev. Proc. 62-32, § 3, 1962-2 C.B. 527, 528. See also S. REP. NO. 89-1707,
reprinted in 1966-2 C.B. 1059; Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 191; Jackel & Sowell, supra note
57, at 1660; BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.2.
108. Rev. Proc. 62-32, § 3.14(b), 1962-2 C.B. 527, 530. See also S. REP. NO. 891707, reprinted in 1966-2 C.B. 1059; Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 191.
109. Interestingly, the Service did not attack exchange funds directly on the “control”
issue. Section 351(a) requires the transferees to be in “control” of eighty percent of the outstanding shares of the corporation after the transfer. I.R.C. § 351(a) (2006). In an exchange
fund, although the shareholders held more than eighty percent of the equity, they did not in
the pre-1962 form of entity have control over the entity. They were more akin to a passive
investor. Yet, the Service never argued substance over form and attacked the pre-arranged
transaction. “In effect, the argument would be that the fund, having been formed initially by
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On July 14, 1966, proposed regulations were recommended.110 These
regulations provided that the exchange fund transaction would not qualify
for nonrecognition treatment.111 Before the Regulations could be passed, in
November of 1966, Congress enacted legislation, commonly referred to as
the Foreign Investor’s Tax Act of 1966, subjecting exchange funds to taxation.112
B. Foreign Investor’s Act of 1966 and 1967 Regulations
The term “investment company” came into tax vernacular in the Foreign Investor’s Tax Act of 1966.113 At the time, this was considered a minor
“Christmas tree” tax bill.114 The legislation was directed at the nonrecognition provision of Section 351.115 Targeted transactions were those that resulted in diversification of securities in a tax-free manner using Section
351.116 Congress “limited nonrecognition treatment under section 351 to
contributions to corporations other than [what are referred to as] ‘investment companies.’”117 Given the action and discussions leading up to the
legislation, it was surprising that the legislation was silent regarding the
operation of the new Section 351.118 In 1967, the Treasury promulgated

issuance of a few shares to the promoter or fund management organization, thereafter simply
distributed its stock to the public in a series of disconnected transactions which are not entitled to be viewed in the aggregate.” Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 192. The aforementioned
series of transactions would then cause the subsequent shareholders to have exchanged their
interests for a noncontrolling interest in the entity and thus create a taxable exchange.
110. S. REP. NO. 89-1707, at 61 (1966), as reprinted in 1966-2 C.B. 1102; Jackel &
Sowell, supra note 57, at 1660.
111. S. REP. NO. 89-1707, at 61 (1966), as reprinted in 1966-2 C.B. 1102. See also
Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1660.
112. Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-809, § 203(c), 80 Stat. 1539,
1577 (1966) (“The amendments made by subsections (a) and (b) [amending this section]
shall apply with respect to transfers of property to investment companies whether made
before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act [Nov. 13, 1966].”).
113. See id. § 203(b).
114. A Stop to the Swap?, TIME, Feb. 10, 1967, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,840854,00.html [hereinafter Stop to the
Swap].
115. See, e.g., T.D. 6942, 1968-1 C.B. 136.
116. Foreign Investors Tax Act § 203. See also S. REP. NO. 1707 (1966), reprinted in
1622-2 C.B. 1059.
117. Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1660. See also Foreign Investors Tax Act
§203; Stop to the Swap, supra note 114.
118. Stop to the Swap, supra note 114 (“Even in the vast and fast-growing mutualfund business, the swaps have had a remarkable rise. The first was organized less than seven
years ago by Denver Banker William M.B. Berger, 41, who had the bright—and right—idea
that Section 351 (a), which had been drawn to allow the tax-free transfers of property to a
new corporation in exchange for stock, could also apply to individual stockholders.”).
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regulations that not only expanded the reach of the legislation, but actually
limited it as well.119
The term “investment company” was defined in the 1967 regulations
broadly.120 The term “investment company” included121: (1) a regulated
investment company (RIC);122 (2) a real estate investment trust (REIT);123 or
(3) a corporation where the assets (excluding cash and nonconvertible debt
obligations) were more than eighty percent of the value of the company.124
The assets defined in the regulations at that time were “readily marketable
stocks or securities, or interests in regulated investment companies or real
estate investment trusts.”125 This became known as the “80% test.” For the
purpose of this threshold test, stock and securities in subsidiary corporations
were disregarded.126 The parent corporation was deemed to own a ratable
share of the subsidiary corporation.127
Since there was no prior guidance, the Regulations had to define the
most basic elements of the new term “investment company.” For example,
when was the 80% test to apply? Immediately after transfer? “The regulations provided that the determination of whether a corporation was an investment company . . . should be made . . . immediately after the transfer in
question.”128 Nonetheless, if there was a change following the contribution,
which was “pursuant to a plan,” then the determination of investment company status was made on the date the plan was completed.129

119. See Rev. Rul. 67-122, 1967-1 C.B. 78.
120. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(c)(1)(ii) (1968).
121. See id.
122. See id. See also I.R.C. § 851 (2006). In sum, RIC must derive at least ninety
percent of its income from dividends, interest, and capital gains. Id.
123. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(c)(1)(ii). See also I.R.C. § 856 (2006). Generally, a REIT
owns income producing real estate and distributes ninety percent of taxable income each year
to shareholders as dividends. Id.
124. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(c)(1)(ii).
125. Id. See also Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1661; BITTKER & LOKKEN,
supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.2.
126. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(c)(4). See also Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1661;
BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.2.
127. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(c)(4). See also Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1661
(finding that for the purposes of the regulations, a “subsidiary” corporation is one where “the
parent owned 50 percent or more of (1) the combined voting power of all classes of stock
entitled to vote, or (2) the total value of shares of all classes of stock outstanding”).
128. Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1661; Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(c)(2) (2009).
See also BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.2.
129. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(c)(2) (2009). See also Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at
1661; BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.2; Sheppard, Rationalizing, supra note
90, at 152 (“It would be nice if all these inquiries about what is being contributed to the
corporation or partnership were objective, but they are not. Regulation section 1.351-1(c)
asks a lot of questions about the parties’ intentions for the contributed assets.”).
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The test for the purposes of the Regulation was whether diversification
was achieved after the transfer.130 So, to some extent, the statute was limited to only situations in which diversification131 took place.132 Further, if
there was diversification, but only to a de minimis amount, this was disregarded for investment company purposes.133 The regulations included a
step-transaction type analysis to determine if there was diversification for
the de minimis rule.134
C. 1976 Legislation Addressing Partnership—New Section 721
By 1976, the investment world had changed.135 In 1966, exchange
funds could only operate through a corporate form. There were various
state partnership problems and a myriad of securities restrictions that prohibited the use of the partnership form. Therefore, when the Foreign Investor’s Tax Act was passed, it only made changes to Section 351 regarding
corporations.136
However, as partnership rules changed in the early 1970s, exchange
funds were being established in the partnership form.137 Almost a blow-byblow reoccurrence of the 1960 events happened with partnerships. First, in
1975, the Service issued a private ruling allowing investors to transfer the
same type of appreciated securities to a partnership without recognizing
current tax.138 In effect, the Service ruled that because there was no similar
130. See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.2.
131. For the purposes of the Regulations, diversification is the transfer, by two or
more people, of nonidentical assets. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(c)(5). See also Jackel & Sowell,
supra note 57, at 1661; BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.2.
132. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(c)(1)(i). See also Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at
1661; BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.2.
133. The example provided in the Regulations is that an amount of less than one
percent (1%) of the total value of assets transferred would be “insignificant.” Treas. Reg. §
1.351-1(c)(5)-(7). See also Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1661-62; BITTKER & LOKKEN,
supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.2.
134. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(c)(5). See also Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1662;
BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.2.
135. See generally STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 94TH CONG., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976 655-56 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter
GENERAL EXPLANATION]; S. REP. NO. 94-938, at 1 (1976); Hesch & Manning, supra note 92;
Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1662.
136. GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 135. As for treatment of partnerships pre1954 subchapter K, taxpayers had to rely on administrative and case law precedents. See
Helvering v. Walbridge, 70 F.2d 683, 684-85 (2d Cir. 1934).
137. GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 135, at 656 (“Recently, however, these
difficulties were resolved and a number of public syndications were organized to sell exchange funds as partnerships.”).
138. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7504280550A (Apr. 28, 1975). The Vance, Sanders Exchange Fund was granted tax-free status. See also GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 135,
at 656; S. REP. NO. 94-938.
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prohibition to 351 in the partnership rules, this transfer was permissible,
thereby opening the floodgates for pre-1966 diversification using the partnership form.139
The ability to use the partnership form was more than merely a change
of form to avoid the investment company rules under Section 351 for corporations. As a partnership, the exchange fund did not incur taxes at the entity
level.140 Items of partnership income, gain, loss, and deductions flowed
through to the investors. Conversely, if the exchange fund was treated as a
corporation, it was subjected to the corporate income tax at current levels.141
Additionally, distributions were characterized as dividends or otherwise
treated as corporate distributions.142 Thus, there was no flow-through of
income, gain, loss, and deductions to the investors.
Congress concluded that the mere shift in form from corporate to partnership should not change the results.143 The diversification of assets,
whether through contributions to a partnership or corporation, should not
have tax-free treatment.144 Unlike in 1966, Congress attacked the partnership version of exchange funds more squarely on the control issue. “Congress noted that, in the typical situation, even after joining an exchange
fund, the investors generally did not want the managers to sell off either
their own or other stocks . . . .”145 Congress differentiated between traditional partnerships where owners pooled assets and know-how in order to
share risks in an ongoing business, and an exchange fund where partners
were not sharing risk, assets, or know-how, but were merely using an investment vehicle jointly.146
Based on this approach during the debates in Committee, it was foreseeable that Congress would enact a corresponding code section to 351 for
partnerships.147 Congress thus enacted Section 721(b), which provided that
the nonrecognition provisions of Section 721(a) of the Code no longer applied “to gain realized on a transfer of property to a partnership which
would be treated as an investment company (within the meaning of section
139. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7504280550A (Apr. 28, 1975).
140. See Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1662.
141. See Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 188-89; Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at
1663; Beldore, supra note 18, at 78.
142. See Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 189; Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1663.
143. See GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 135, at 656; S. REP. NO. 94-938; Jackel
& Sowell, supra note 57, at 1663. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
144. S. REP. NO. 94-938; Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1663. See supra note
134 and accompanying text.
145. Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1662. See also GENERAL EXPLANATION,
supra note 135, at 656; S. REP. NO. 94-938, pt. 11.
146. See Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1662. See also GENERAL EXPLANATION,
supra note 135, at 656; S. REP. NO. 94-938, pt. 11.
147. The 1976 legislation also enacted Section 683, which applied the investment
company rules to trusts.
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351) if the partnership were incorporated.”148 Moreover, once a partnership
was classified as an investment company, the entity was prohibited from
electing out of partnership tax classification under Section 761(a).149
In the legislation, Congress also attacked corporate reorganizations
that resulted in diversification. Congress closed the loophole left after Section 351 by enacting Section 368(a)(2)(F). This prevented taxpayers from
diversifying the appreciated securities through contribution to a wholly
owned corporation and later merging that corporation with other corporations.150 There were significant differences between Sections 368(a)(2)(F)
and 351 involving the calculation of the 80% test.151 At its heart, Section
368 exempted reorganization transfers for entities that already held diversified portfolios.152
D. 1980 Proposed Regulations
Changes to the Regulations under Section 368(a)(2)(F)153 of the Code
and an amendment to regulations under Section 1.351-1(c) were proposed
by the Service. The proposed regulations were designed to deal with transfers to pre-existing entities. For example, assume that there are two companies which hold one asset that is a single stock position. If one company
transferred 80% of the voting stock in exchange for 100% of the voting
stock of the other company, would it qualify under Section 351? Under the
proposed regulations, this would not qualify.154 The distinction in the proposed regulations would be that the de minimis rule would no longer apply.
These proposed regulations were not finalized and were actually revoked in
1998.155
E. 1996 Regulations
In 1976, when Congress promulgated Section 721 of the Code for
partnerships and Section 368 for reorganizations, a broader definition of
diversification was utilized.156 Under the Regulations for Section 351 in
148. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 721, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).
149. See GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 135, at 658 n.6; Jackel & Sowell, supra
note 57, at 1662.
150. See Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1662.
151. Id. at n.16.
152. See id. at 1663.
153. Investment Companies, 46 Fed. Reg. 1744, 1747-48 (proposed Jan. 7, 1981).
See also Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1663.
154. Investment Companies, 46 Fed. Reg. 1744, 1746 (proposed Jan. 7, 1981). See
also Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1663.
155. See Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1664; Withdrawal of Proposed Regulations, 63 Fed. Reg. 71047 (proposed Dec. 23, 1998).
156. See supra Section IV.C.
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1967, a more stringent rule existed that resulted in diversification unless
there was a de minimis transfer.157 In the early 1990s, the Service started to
issue private letter rulings providing a case-by-case determination of whether diversification had occurred.158 Because the Service was no longer following the fixed approach under the earlier regulations, the area of de minimis transactions became subjective.159
In 1996, the regulations were amended to provide for an objective
standard.160 The regulations provided that a contribution of diversified securities to an entity would not result in diversification.161 As any estate
planning attorney could attest, if one contributes a diversified portfolio and
receives back a proportionate share in the company, there is no diversification.162 The test for diversification is the same as in Section 368(a)(2)(F).163
There is no diversification and thus nonrecognition “if not more than 25
percent of the value of its total assets is invested in the stock and securities
of any one issuer and not more than 50 percent of the value of its total assets
is invested in the stock and securities of 5 or fewer issuers.”164
F. Amendment of 351(e) in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997
As is often the problem with reactionary legislation, the Service and
Congress acted before they had a full understanding of the complex financial instruments they were attacking. The Service thought that exchange
funds had gone by the wayside, even though that was not true.165 Therefore,
in 1997, Congress added Section 351(e) to expand the categories of assets

157. See Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1661.
158. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9519003 (Jan. 31, 1995); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
9518005 (Jan. 31, 1995); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9509010 (Nov. 30, 1994); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 9451035 (Sept. 20, 1994); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9421014 (Feb. 23, 1994); I.R.S. Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 9351031 (Sept. 28, 1993).
159. See Sheppard, Ruby Slippers, supra note 8, at 1700-01; Jackel & Sowell, supra
note 57, at 1663-64; BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.2.
160. Transfers to Investment Companies, 60 Fed. Reg. 40794, 40794-96 (proposed
Aug. 10, 1995). See also Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1664.
161. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(c)(6)(i) (1999). See also Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57,
at 1664.
162. See Hesch & Manning, supra note 92, at 204 (“Essentially, diversification occurs if other family members (or any other investors) transfer different assets to the same
partnership. If two or more transferors contribute identical assets to a newly organized partnership, the pooling does not result in diversification.”). Often in estate planning contexts,
husband and wife would contribute the different securities to a joint account first, then transfer their respective interests to the newly formed family partnership.
163. See Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1663-64.
164. I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(F)(ii) (2006). See also Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at
1663.
165. For example, Beldore closed in October, 2008. Beldore, supra note 18.
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included in the definition of “investment company.”166 This was Congress’s
attempt to stop the newest evolution of exchange funds.167
The new Section 351(e) greatly expanded which assets would determine whether an entity, other than a RIC or REIT, would be classified as an
investment company.168 Prior to 1997, the 80% test was limited to readily
marketable securities, stocks, or interests in RICs or REITs.169 The newly
expanded Act stated if more than 80% of the assets were:
money; stocks [or] other equity interests in a corporation; evidences of indebtedness, options, forward or future contracts, notional principal contracts or derivatives; foreign currency; some interests in precious metals; interests in REITs, RICs,
common trust funds, and publicly traded partnerships; or other interests in noncorporate entities that are convertible into, or exchangeable for, any of the assets
listed,170

then the contribution would be subject to taxation.171 The question remains:
why did Congress try to legislate away a loophole that easily could have
been closed by prohibiting the diversification in total?172
Upon the review of the legislative history, Congress merely limited
the types of assets that could be used for the 80% test. Congress did not
override the existing regulations.173

166. Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1664; Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L.
No. 105-34, § 1002(a), 111 Stat. 788, 909 (1997); STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
105TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN 1997 183 (Comm.
Print 1997) [hereinafter 1997 LEGISLATION EXPLANATION] (“Of particular concern to the
Congress was the reappearance of so-called ‘swap funds,’ which are partnerships or RICs
that are structured to fall outside the definition of an investment company, and thereby allow
contributors to make tax-free contributions of stock and securities in exchange for an interest
in an entity that holds similar assets.”).
167. Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1664; Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 § 1002(a);
1997 LEGISLATION EXPLANATION, supra note 166, at 183.
168. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF
REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2001 BUDGET PROPOSAL
361-62 (Comm. Print. 2000); Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1664-65.
169. Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1664.
170. Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1664-65.
171. I.R.C. § 1:731-2(c)(3)(i) (1996); Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1664-65.
172. See, e.g., Sheppard, Ruby Slippers, supra note 8, at 1701.
173. See Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1665 (“Specifically, the legislative history states that the new statute does not override: (1) the requirement that only assets held for
investment are considered for purposes of the definition; (2) the rule treating the assets of a
subsidiary as owned proportionally by a parent owning 50 percent or more of its stock; (3)
the requirement that a contribution of property to an investment company must result in
diversification for gain to be recognized; and (4) the requirement that the investment company determination must consider any plan concerning an entity’s assets in existence at the
time of the transfer.”).
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V. TAX ANALYSIS
Since the first reported exchange fund in 1960,174 Congress and the
Service have been, through piecemeal legislation, attacking and narrowing
the rules for these entities. They have created a minefield of burdensome
rules without directly attacking the root problem. However, these rules are
only an issue for the ill-advised.175 With a well thought out plan, these rules
are easy to avoid.176 However, if a company fails the investment company
tests, the penalty is high—gain recognition for all investors.177 Thus, one
would expect to have a black-and-white result for contributions. Clarity on
how to navigate the rules in Sections 351 and 721 of the Code does not exist. The following highlights some of the shortfalls of the current system.
A. Financial Instruments and the 80-20 Rule
As discussed earlier, Section 721(b) provides the general rule that gain
is recognized where a transfer of appreciated stocks, securities, or other
property is made to a partnership that would be treated as an investment
company under Section 351 were the partnership a corporation.178 The determination whether a partnership will be treated as an investment company
is made under Section 351(e)(1).179
Since the purpose of Section 351 is being abused by exchange fund
promoters, congressional reactionary legislation continues to miss all the
different financial instruments that can be used in place of prohibited assets.
Given the patchwork approach Congress and the Service have taken to decide which items are and are not securities, it is no surprise that the promoters of exchange funds can either create or find financial instruments that
are not addressed by the statute.
174. Stop to the Swap, supra note 114.
175. For example, the estate planner who triggered gain on the contribution of assets
to a family limited partnership. Hesch & Manning, supra note 92, at 200-01. See also Sheppard, Rationalizing, supra note 90, at 152.
176. After all, that is the reason we have the rules. As sophisticated tax professionals
are given rules, they immediately think of how to avoid the rules. See generally Sheppard,
Rationalizing, supra note 90, at 152; Sheppard, Ruby Slippers, supra note 8, at 1700-01;
Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1667.
177. See Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1667.
178. I.R.C. § 721(b) (1997). See generally BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, at ¶
91.2.2; Beldore, supra note 18, at 79.
179. A partnership will be treated as an investment company if, after the exchange,
over eighty percent of the value of its assets are held for investment and are “stock and securities” (or interests in real estate investment trusts or in regulated investment companies).
Property covered by this gain recognition rule isn’t limited to stock and securities but includes eight categories of assets. See Hesch & Manning, supra note 92, at 201; Beldore,
supra note 18, at 79.
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At the heart of the matter, financial instruments are merely contracts.
There are two counterparties agreeing to terms. Since the instruments are
largely unregulated, they are easily manipulated. The most basic example
of manipulation of instruments is if the government was to prohibit the use
of a put option. However, a put option actually has two components: a
knock-in and knock-out option.180 So, if an investor bought a knock-in and
knock-out option, he or she is not violating the put option rules.181 Further,
these instruments are merely contracts between a buyer and a seller.182 They
are not regulated, and the other side of the contract (other than through traditional contractual remedies) might not be able to fulfill his or her obligation at close.183
In the realm of exchange funds, there are often a lot of games played
using “security-like” assets. It is in the interest of the fund’s promoter to
locate assets that provide stable returns with some level of liquidity but that
are not classified as “securities” for the purposes of Section 351.184 Most
often, fund promoters work around the term “evidences of indebtedness.”185
Under Treasury Regulation Section 1.1275-1(d), the term “debt instrument” is “any instrument or contractual arrangement that constitutes
indebtedness under general principles of Federal income tax law (including,
for example, a certificate of deposit or a loan).”186 So, for the purposes of
the aforementioned regulation, a “debt instrument” is an “evidence of indebtedness.”187
Even with all the congressional and governmental actions, there is no
direct authority if “the term ‘evidence of indebtedness’ is limited to traditional debt instruments.”188 How would the Service consider a cash flow
180. See generally Peter Carr & Andrew Chou, Hedging Complex Barrier Options
(New York University Working Paper 2002), available at http//www.math.nyu.edu/ research/carrp/papers/pdf/multipl3.pdf; JON C. COX & MARK RUBINSTEIN, OPTIONS MARKETS
(1985); George L. Ye, Exotic Options: Boundary Analyses, 15 J. DERIVATIVES & HEDGE
FUNDS 149-57 (2009).
181. Carr & Chou, supra note 180; COX & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 180; and Ye,
supra note 180.
182. Carr & Chou, supra note 180; COX & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 180; and Ye,
supra note 180.
183. Carr & Chou, supra note 180; COX & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 180; and Ye,
supra note 180.
184. See Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1672; Sheppard, Rationalizing, supra
note 90, at 152-53.
185. See Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1669 (“‘Evidences of Indebtedness’ is
not the only ambiguous phrase contained in the description of listed assets.”); BITTKER &
LOKKEN, supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.1.
186. Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-1(d) (1994).
187. See Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1669; BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note
42, at ¶ 91.2.3.
188. Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1669. See also BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra
note 42, at ¶ 91.2.4.
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stream of rental real estate?189 What about viatical settlement contracts?
The ambiguity harkens back to one of the fundamental problems related to
exchange funds: investment company treatment. If one is incorrect in his or
her determination that an asset class qualifies, then the result will be investment company status.190 This will create a current tax for contributors.
Most importantly, the traditional assets used in the exchange fund
structure to satisfy the 80% test are interests in umbrella real estate investment trusts (UPREITs).191 Congress classified REITs as “securities” for the
purposes of satisfying the 80% test in the investment company rules.192 As a
result, the promoters turned to the REITs’ close cousin: the UPREIT. A
UPREIT is essentially a REIT with a lock-up.193 More specifically,
UPREIT units are exchangeable, after a fixed period, into stock of the underlying REIT at the election of the UPREIT holder .194
It could be effectively argued that the UPREIT units do not pass the
“evidence of indebtedness” test as they appear to be “readily convertible”
into either stock of the REIT or money.195 On one hand, the exchange fund
would argue that, given the lock-up, the units are not readily convertible
until after the fixed period.196 The problem that arises is two-fold. First,
there is no definition of “readily convertible.”197 Second, Congress and the
Service are unable to comprehend the difficulty in legislating against financial instruments. These contracts can be manipulated with specific carveouts to meet any rule.

189. Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1669.
190. See Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1669; Sheppard, Rationalizing, supra
note 90, at 152. See also Beldore supra note 18, at 3-5.
191. See Beldore, supra note 18, at 3-5; Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1669.
192. I.R.C. § 351 (2000).
193. See Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1669; Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(d), Example
4; Beldore, supra note 18, at 3-5.
194. Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1669. Sometimes the conversion is into
actual cash at the option of the REIT. This would be even better for the exchange fund manager as after seven years, they can convert readily to cash positions for the unwinding of the
entity. See id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See id. (noting that there are “similar rules in the installment sale regulations
under section 453.” In Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(e)(5), an obligation is readily tradable if the
obligation may be converted to a tradable security without a substantial discount. “For this
purpose, a ‘substantial discount’ exists if the obligation, when issued, is convertible for less
than 80 percent of its current value.” Generally, UPREITs are convertible at a one-to-one
basis, and they have equivalent fair market values; thus UPREITs would seem to meet the
aforementioned standard).
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B. Timing of Investment Company Status
“Treasury Regulation Section 1.351-1(c)(2) provides that the determination of whether a corporation is an investment company will ordinarily be
made . . . immediately after the transfer.”198 However, when the investment
blends or “circumstances change pursuant to a plan in existence at the time
of transfer, the determination” will be made after the plan is in place.199
Most funds have a requirement in the agreement that will ensure that more
than 20% of the assets will be invested in Qualifying Assets.200
There is no true guidance on determining what is or is not a plan in the
context of Sections 351 and 721.201 In at least two other Code sections,
there is guidance as to what constitutes a “plan.”202 More importantly, the
Service often uses the term “plan” in arguing for application of the “step
transaction doctrine.”203 When taxpayers attempt to skirt the technical application of the rules through a literal interpretation, the Service takes the
position that the series of steps will be integrated into one transaction.204

198. Beldore, supra note 18, at 80. See also Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1665.
199. Beldore, supra note 18, at 80. See also Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1665,
1666-67; BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.2.
200. See Beldore, supra note 18, at 3 (“Separate from its investment in the Portfolio
through the Company, the Fund will also invest in certain assets that must constitute at least
20% of the Fund’s assets in order for the exchange of contributed securities for the Shares of
the Fund to be non-taxable.”); Sheppard, Ruby Slippers, supra note 8, at 1700 (“Greene
Street promises that at least 21 percent of the master partnership’s portfolio will consist of
things that are not covered by section 351(e)(1)(B) . . . .”).
201. See I.R.S Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9013016 (Mar. 30, 1990) (responding to an inquiry
where the partners contributed timber cutting rights, timber and timber land, and marketable
securities to a partnership). Partners had no plan to dispose of the timber and timber land for
the next two years and no more than $500,000 of the timber would be sold within the next
five years. Service ruled that this was not an investment company. Id. See also Jackel &
Sowell, supra note 57, at 1666; BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.2; Sheppard,
Ruby Slippers, supra note 8, at 1699-1701.
202. See proposed regulations under Section 355(e) of the Code, which defines the
phrase “plan (or series of related transactions)” broadly. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-7, 66 Fed.
Reg. 66, 67 (Jan. 2, 2001). While the regulations under Section 355(d) of the Code narrowly
define “plan,” a “plan or arrangement” only exists if there are formal understandings. Treas.
Reg. § 1.355-6(c)(4) (2008). See Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1666 n.51.
203. See Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1666.
204. The main step transaction theories are “binding commitment,” “mutual interdependence,” or “end result.” See Comm’r v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83, 96 (1968) (“[I]f one transaction is to be characterized as a ‘first step’ there must be a binding commitment to take the
later steps.”); Am. Bantam Car Co. v. Comm’r, 11 T.C. 397, 405 (1948), aff’d 177 F.2d 513
(3d Cir. 1949) (stating that factors to consider include the mutual interdependence and temporal proximity of the acts); Kanawha Gas & Utils. Co. v. Comm’r, 214 F.2d. 685, 691 (5th
Cir. 1954) (finding that the end result is a “series of transactions designed and executed as
parts of a unitary plan to achieve an intended result”). See also Jackel & Sowell, supra note
57, at 1666.
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Arguably, the overall requirement that the fund maintain a qualifying ratio
of investments might be sufficient to meet the plan tests.205
Regardless of how the Service would interpret the term “plan,” the
question is whether this is a static determination.206 Is the determination
made upon formation? Is it made after the plan is to be completed? Is it to
be made each year? It has been effectively argued by some that a better
reading of the regulations is that taxpayers should analyze investment company status immediately after a contribution.207 In the case of an asset mix
which changes over time “pursuant to a plan” (which exists upon contribution), any changes caused by the plan should relate back to the date of contribution.208 Therefore, even though at times the entity is out of compliance,
this is not fatal and can be cured.
C. Tax Avoidance
So what happens when tax practitioners apply certain sections to unintended and unexpected situations? Generally, the Service goes on the offensive and attacks the problem. For example, when tax practitioners were
using Sections 358 or 752209 to shelter billions of dollars210 the Service acted
205. See Beldore, supra note 18, at 3 (“[T]he Fund will also invest in certain assets
that must constitute at least 20% of the Fund’s assets in order for the exchange of contributed
securities for Shares of the Fund to be non-taxable.”).
206. Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1666.
207. See Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1667. See also Sheppard, Ruby Slippers,
supra note 8, at 1701; BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.2; Treas. Reg. § 1.3511(c)(5) (2008).
208. See Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1667. See also Sheppard, Ruby Slippers,
supra note 8, at 1701; BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.2; Treas. Reg. § 1.3511(c)(5) (2008).
209. See I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, 2000-36 I.R.B. 255 (2000) (“The purported losses
from these transactions (and from any similar arrangements designed to produce noneconomic tax losses by artificially overstating basis in partnership interests) are not allowable as
deductions for federal income tax purposes. The purported tax benefits from these transactions may also be subject to disallowance under other provisions of the Code and regulations.
In particular, the transactions may be subject to challenge under § 752, or under § 1.701-2 or
other anti-abuse rules.”).
210. I.R.S. News Release IR-2005-37 (Mar. 24, 2005):
These arrangements purport to give taxpayers artificially high basis in partnership
interests and thereby give rise to deductible losses on disposition of those partnership interests.
One variation involves a taxpayer’s borrowing at a premium and a partnership’s
subsequent assumption of that indebtedness. As an example of this variation, a
taxpayer may receive $3,000X in cash from a lender under a loan agreement that
provides for an inflated stated rate of interest and a stated principal amount of only
$2,000X. The taxpayer contributes the $3,000X to a partnership, and the partnership assumes the indebtedness. The partnership thereafter engages in investment
activities. At a later time, the taxpayer sells the partnership interest.
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quickly and decisively to stop the abuse. With the state of the economy, the
need for additional revenues and the general policy of consistent application
of the rules, the tax avoidance structure of swap or exchange funds needs to
be addressed. The issue has not been addressed in Congress since 1999
when Representative Neal introduced a bill to amend Section 351.211 As a
country, we are facing tough decisions, and to exempt from examination a
loophole for only the wealthy would be an injustice. In fact, the lead paragraph from a Forbes Magazine article in 2001 was: “The trouble with looUnder the position advanced by the promoters of this arrangement, the taxpayer
claims that only the stated principal amount of the indebtedness, $2,000X in this
example, is considered a liability assumed by the partnership that is treated as a
distribution of money to the taxpayer that reduces the basis of the taxpayer’s partnership interest under § 752 of the Internal Revenue Code. Therefore, disregarding
any additional amounts the taxpayer may contribute to the partnership, transaction
costs, and any income realized or expenses incurred at the partnership level, the
taxpayer purports to have a basis in the partnership interest equal to the excess of
the cash contributed over the stated principal amount of the indebtedness, even
though the taxpayer’s net economic outlay to acquire the partnership interest and
the value of the partnership interest are nominal or zero. In this example, the taxpayer purports to have a basis in the partnership interest of $1,000X (the excess of
the cash contributed ($3,000X) over the stated principal amount of the indebtedness ($2,000X)). On disposition of the partnership interest, the taxpayer claims a
tax loss with respect to that basis amount, even though the taxpayer has incurred no
corresponding economic loss.
In another variation, a taxpayer purchases and writes options and purports to
create substantial positive basis in a partnership interest by transferring those option positions to a partnership. For example, a taxpayer might purchase call options for a cost of $1,000X and simultaneously write offsetting call options, with a
slightly higher strike price but the same expiration date, for a premium of slightly
less than $1,000X. Those option positions are then transferred to a partnership
which, using additional amounts contributed to the partnership, may engage in investment activities.
Under the position advanced by the promoters of this arrangement, the taxpayer
claims that the basis in the taxpayer’s partnership interest is increased by the cost
of the purchased call options but is not reduced under § 752 as a result of the partnership’s assumption of the taxpayer’s obligation with respect to the written call
options. Therefore, disregarding additional amounts contributed to the partnership,
transaction costs, and any income realized and expenses incurred at the partnership
level, the taxpayer purports to have a basis in the partnership interest equal to the
cost of the purchased call options ($1,000X in this example), even though the taxpayer’s net economic outlay to acquire the partnership interest and the value of the
partnership interest are nominal or zero. On the disposition of the partnership interest, the taxpayer claims a tax loss ($1,000X in this example), even though the
taxpayer has incurred no corresponding economic loss.
The Internal Revenue Service announced today that taxpayers participating in
the Son of Boss tax shelter settlement have so far paid in more than $3.2 billion, a
figure that should top $3.5 billion when the project concludes in coming months.
Id.
211.

H.R. 2705, 106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999).
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pholes is that the better they are, the better the chance they’ll be closed. For
years now, lawmakers have been trying to do away with exchange funds,
also known as ‘swap funds,’ which allow holders of highly appreciated
stock to diversify without paying capital gains taxes.”212 Yet, here we are in
2009 with the “loophole” in full force.
Moreover, it appears that the approach advocated by Representative
Neal equates swap or exchange funds with other types of hedging transactions taxpayers can enter into without current taxation.213 For example, a
taxpayer with a single stock position in Exxon can execute a “costless collar” on the stock by buying a put and a call on the security.214 Costless collars can be established to fully protect existing long stock positions with
little or no cost since the premium paid for the protective puts is offset by
the premiums received for writing the covered calls.215 Depending on the
volatility of the underlying stock, the call strike can range from 30% to 70%
out of money, enabling the writer of the call to still enjoy a limited profit
should the stock price rise.216 The second step to the “collar” strategy is
then to borrow against the fixed position.217 The end result of the “collar”
strategy is similar to an exchange fund: an investor would have cash in order to diversify his or her position.
However, the fundamental difference between the two strategies is the
limitation placed on the time horizon of a derivative option compared to the
exchange fund. The future horizon of a covered call position is generally
five years. Therefore, at the end of the five-year period, if the underlying
security significantly decreased or increased in price and did not stay within
its range of the collar, the cost of replacing the collar becomes prohibitive.
212. Boss, supra note 14.
213. See Sheppard, Ruby Slippers, supra note 8, at 1701.
214. A “costless collar” is the purchase of a put on the stock exercisable in the future
with the simultaneous writing of an out-of-the money covered call option with a strike price
which is equal to the premium of the put option. See generally Beldore, supra note 18, at 4142; Barnet Phillips, IV, Exchange Funds: What Is Diversification?, 838 PLI/TAX 583, 611
(2007); Erika W. Nijenhuis, William L. McRae & Elena V. Romanova, Everything I Know
About New Financial Products I Learned From DECS, 850 PLI/TAX 129, 179 (2008); Lawrence D. Cavanagh, Hedging Your Stock With Collars, VALUE LINE OPTIONS,
http://www.valueline.com/edu_options/rep13.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2009); The Options
Guide, Costless Collar (Zero-Cost Collar), http://www.theoptionsguide.com/costlesscollar.aspx (last visited Oct. 15, 2009).
215. See generally Beldore, supra note 18, at 41-42; Cavanagh, supra note 214;
Wilmington Trust, Costless Collars: Protecting the Value of Your Securities,
http://www.wilmingtontrust.com/wtcom/index.jsp?fileid=3000206 (last visited Oct. 15,
2009).
216. See generally Beldore, supra note 18, at 41-42; Cavanagh, supra note 214;
Wilmington Trust, supra note 215.
217. See Beldore, supra note 18, at 41-42; Wilmington Trust, supra note 215 (“[I]n
this case, the lender might be able to lend up to 80% to 90% of the put strike price.”).
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For example, assume that Exxon was at $25 a share when the collars were
placed on the stock. The collars lasted five years. At the end of the fiveyear period, if Exxon was worth $5 a share, then the collars did what they
were supposed to do, they protected the wealth.218
How is an exchange fund any different than a tax shelter or allowing
hedge fund managers to defer paying billions of dollars?219 If one believes
that there are similarities, then it is easy to envision a similar chain of events
unfolding as took place in the hedge fund industry. The hedge fund industry went through its public offering bonanza during 2007.220 This spurred
Congress to begin “focus[ing] on the tax loopholes allowing these ownerindividuals to monetize their carried interest at a significantly reduced
tax.”221
The argument for maintaining the current legislative rules is that after
over fifty years222 if they truly were a cause for concern, then legislation
would have been enacted. However, there is very little if anything written
on the subject.223 Why would a multibillion-dollar industry have so little
guidance?
In fact, there have been no congressional hearings or press on the merits of changing the law. There have been no hearings since Representative
Neal’s proposed legislation in 1999. In today’s environment, one would
expect that the arguments should center on the question of the fundamental
fairness for a perceived tax preference for the wealthy. Assuming that Con218. Collars also have other risks such as SEC reporting rules including volume
limitation sale rules. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144. Also, desired tax results are not specifically
confirmed by Treasury Regulations.
219. See generally David J. Herzig, Carried Interest: Can They Effectively Be
Taxed?, 4 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 23 (2009).
220. See, e.g., Fortress Investment Group LLC, Registration Statement (Form S-1)
(Nov. 8, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1380393/000095013
606009310/file1.htm.
221. Herzig, supra note 219, at 25. See also David Cho, Blackstone IPO Faces
Roadblock in Senate, WASH. POST, June 15, 2007, at D1 (“Publicly traded partnerships are
rare, especially in the financial sector. The senators expressed concern that Blackstone’s
offering would set a dangerous precedent and lead to a wave of financial firms reorganizing
themselves to take advantage of the tax loophole.”); Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Blackstone Proves Carried Interests Can Be Valued, 115 TAX NOTES 1236, 1237 (2007) [hereinafter Sheppard, News Analysis] (finding that the structuring in the Fortress and Blackstone
initial public offerings created basis increases and tax savings not previously available).
222. See Stop to the Swap, supra note 114 (The first swap fund is attributed in 1960
to Denver Banker William M.B. Berger. He “had the bright—and right—idea that Section
351(a), which had been drawn to allow the tax-free transfer of property to a new corporation
in exchange for stock, could also apply to individual stockholders. His Centennial Fund
drew 191 investors, who pooled securities worth $25,800,000. Berger’s idea has been widely
copied. Boston’s Vance, Sanders & Co. operates four funds currently worth $311.2 million.”).
223. See Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1660.
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gress desires to change the current law, as evidenced by the President’s recent rhetoric,224 the focus should be on the most effective solution.
Exchange funds are established for the purpose of avoiding investment
company status.225 The promoter of the fund sets up an entity with a predetermined set of assets at 80% marketable securities and 20% illiquid investments within the definition of either Section 351 or 721 depending on
the type of entity.226 The question that begs to be asked is: Why are these
entities allowed to be formed for the primary purpose of avoiding investment company status?227
Treasury Regulations Section 1.701-2 provides that “if a partnership is
formed or availed of in connection with a transaction a principal purpose of
which is to reduce substantially the present value of the partners’ aggregate
federal [income] tax liability in a manner that is inconsistent with the intent”
of the partnership provision of the Code, the Service has the authority to recharacterize the transaction.228 The Service can preclude the tax benefits
sought under this authority.229 Further, the investment company rules for
reorganizations, Section 368(a)(2)(F), permits “ignor[ing] assets acquired
for the purpose of ceasing to be an investment company.”230
The promoters/proponents of the exchange funds argue that the
aforementioned rules should not apply.231
Tax counsel does not believe that treating a contribution of securities to a partnership as not currently taxable when the partnership does not come within the investment company definition expressly approved by Congress when it amended

224. See Obama for America, supra note 11.
225. See, e.g., Sheppard, Ruby Slippers, supra note 8, at 1700 (“Greene Street’s, uh,
investment objectives show the overwhelming tax-avoidance motive of its formation.”);
Beldore, supra note 18, at 3 (“The Fund will also invest in certain assets that must constitute
at least 20% of the Fund’s assets in order for the exchange of contributed securities for
Shares of the Fund to be non-taxable . . . .”).
226. See, e.g., Sheppard, Ruby Slippers, supra note 8, at 1700; Beldore, supra note
18, at 3.
227. The question has been asked and not answered before. See Sheppard, Ruby
Slippers, supra note 8, at 1700-02; Sheppard, Rationalizing, supra note 90; Johnston, supra
note 6.
228. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2 (2009). See also Hesch & Manning, supra note 92, at 209
(“As a general proposition, because the investment company regulations comprehensively
deal with transfers of securities to partnerships, the anti-abuse regulations should not apply
when the family partnership arrangement is designed to void the specific provisions of
§721(b).”).
229. Under Treasury Regulation section 1.701-2, the service has outlawed many
schemes, including tax shelters. See, e.g., Jade Trading, LLC v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 11
(2007); Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, LLC v. United States, 440 F. Supp. 2d 608 (E.D. Tex.
2006).
230. See Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1667-68. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(F)(iv)
(2006).
231. See Beldore, supra note 18, at 80.
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Code Section 351(e) in 1997 would be found to be inconsistent with the intent of
the partnership provisions of the Code.232

This position, amazing as it may appear, seems to be supported by the Service.
In Private Letter Ruling 200017051, the Service took the position that
when assets were “transferred to a partnership for the sole or primary purpose of avoiding investment company status,” it was permissible.233 After
the death of the decedent, the family went through an overall reorganization
of its assets.234 Three trusts transferred various interests including marketable securities, promissory notes, and real estate interests, to a limited partnership.235 The real estate interests were held in limited liability companies
(LLCs).236 The Service looked through the LLCs to the underlying assets
and concluded that the qualifying assets were greater than 20%.237 Thus, the
partnership did not qualify as an investment company.238 The ruling did not
opine on the use of the LLC interests solely to avoid qualifying for investment company status.239 However, the ruling did not negate that the only
reason for qualifying was the basket of interests that the family put together.
As discussed supra, in most sophisticated exchange funds, there is a
strong correlation between the 20% illiquid portion and the promoter of the
fund.240 For example, in the Eaton Vance fund, the qualifying assets are part
of a newly formed real estate investment trust that is owned and operated by
the promoter.241 This is a similar structure to PLR 200017051. However, it
seems disingenuous to state that this is any different than a Section 368 reorganization. The promoter set up an entity other than to accomplish a singular tax objective.242 The promoter even went so far as to establish the
illiquid portion of the fund and exercise control over that asset to allow the
investor a further level of comfort.243
Why do the Service and Congress allow exchange funds to follow the
letter of the Code here when the underlying premise of an exchange fund
232. Id.
233. Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1668. See also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
200017051 (Apr. 28, 2000).
234. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200017051.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See generally Beldore, supra note 18, at 3; Sheppard, Ruby Slippers, supra note
8, at 1700; BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, at ¶ 91.2.2; Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57,
at 1678.
241. Beldore, supra note 18, at 3 (“The Fund expects to hold all or a substantial portion of its real estate investments through . . . a newly organized Delaware corporation.”).
242. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200017051 (Jan. 24, 2005).
243. Id.
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fails? Section 351 of the Code was never designed to apply to these types
of entities. To argue that the fund fits within the intent of the Code for tax
avoidance one has to accept that the fund fails to meet the intent of the Code
in formation.
VI. ADDITIONAL BENEFITS
It would have been expected that having a congressionally authorized
diversification tool would have been sufficient for the fortunate few who
held a security that the promoter of the exchange fund desired.244 However,
as is often the case with advantageous tax laws, the beneficiary of the accumulated advantage continues to look for further benefits.
A. Estate Planning
In the realm of exchange funds, the contributors continue to strain the
tax system by often employing estate tax strategies.245 One of the most
common estate planning techniques is the “estate freeze.”246 An interesting
aspect of the exchange fund is that not only is this type of a transaction contemplated, but it is also often specifically provided for in the limited liability
company agreement.247 For example, in one prospectus, a shareholder may
divide his or her shares into a preferred component and a common component.248 In that fund, the preferred shares are the current value of the stock
and the common shares are the growth over the preferred.249 Why would
this be part of the agreement if it were not often utilized? In fact, the promoter of the exchange fund will use this as a selling point of the fund. Not
only does the shareholder gain the tax advantage of tax-free diversification,

244. See generally Johnston, supra note 6; Sheppard, Ruby Slippers, supra note 8, at
1699 (“Swap funds, therefore, are for mere millionaires, rather than multimillionaires.”).
245. See Beldore, supra note 18, at 12-13 (“In the event of the death of a Shareholder,
the tax basis of the Shareholder’s interest in the Fund generally will be increased or decreased to the fair market value of such interest as of the date of death or six months thereafter.”).
246. In this transaction, the senior generation would either contribute an asset to a
partnership-type entity or convert an existing entity into common and preferred shares. This
manipulation of the ownership structure is designed to create a controlling class of shares and
an equity class of shares. Once this conversion is completed, the senior generation will then
sell to an entity (often a trust for the junior generation) the common shares. The senior generation will then retain the control shares. The sale of the interest will “freeze” the value for
estate tax purposes. Thus, any growth on the assets after the sale will not be subject to the
estate tax at the senior generation death.
247. See Beldore, supra note 18, at 100.
248. Id. This occurs within the “Estate Freeze Election” section of the PPM.
249. Id.
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but he or she gets tax savings at death. So the shareholder gets to “cheat”
the system twice.
Finally, even without using the aforementioned technique, upon death
of a shareholder, the tax basis of the shareholder’s interest in the exchange
fund generally will be increased or decreased to the fair market value of
such interest at the date of death.250 The step-up in basis will be subject to
the prescribed limits in 2010.251
B. Borrowing Against the Fund
The argument put forth by the Committee for Joint Taxation, which
dismissed Representative Neal’s proposed legislation in 1999, was that even
if the law was changed, the wealthy would find alternatives that allowed the
same tax-free diversification.252 “The Congressional Joint Committee on
Taxation, without any supporting data, has written [Representative] Neal to
say that no revenue would be raised by closing exchange funds because ‘the
class of investors engaging in swap funds’ would find other ways to avoid
the tax.”253 What the Committee failed to discuss was that not only were the
potential investors of the exchange fund utilizing the vehicles for tax-free
diversification, but they were also borrowing out their original basis.254 In
effect, the potential investors would receive the best of both worlds.
Part of the selling point of the exchange fund is the ability to make
distributions to an investor of his or her original basis.255 Thus, assume that
the investor has $5 million of XYZ corporation, a publicly traded NYSE
stock. The investor paid (has a basis) of $1 million in the stock. The exchange fund promotes the following scenario to the investor—put in $5
million and at the end of seven years the fund will deliver a diversified portfolio of securities. Further, if the investor elects, over a three-year period,
the fund will allow him or her to borrow out of the fund his or her original
basis—in this case $1 million. At the end of the seven-year period, the investor would have a tax-free diversified portfolio and the ability to have
invested the $1 million outside of the fund.256
When the Committee said that the investors would find another way to
avoid tax, it was correct. The wealthy not only have continued to invest in
the funds, but they have avoided the additional taxation that would normally
250. Or six months thereafter. Economic Growth & Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16 §1022(a), 115 Stat. 38, 76 (2001).
251. Id.
252. See Jackel & Sowell, supra note 57, at 1682; Johnston, supra note 6, at C2.
253. Johnston, supra note 6, at C2.
254. Investment houses will allow margin account borrowings against Exchange
Funds.
255. See Beldore, supra note 18.
256. See generally id.
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exist in a borrowing situation and continue to maximize their tax-free
growth.
CONCLUSION
The underlying fact that must finally be accepted is that exchange
funds exist only for the purpose of avoiding taxation. Every part of the exchange fund is designed around a specific rule. The term of the fund, set at
seven years, is designed to avoid Section 704(c)(1)(B). The 80%–20% asset
breakdown exists only to avoid the investment company rules under Sections 351 or 721. The 20% illiquid security is specifically engineered for
the fund to satisfy the tax code.
What is unclear is why Congress continues to allow this tax shelter to
exist. Each time that legislation has been brought to the forefront, it has
been dismissed in committee. Part of the problem is that no one really
knows the extent of the industry. Another part of the problem is that it has
the veneer of legitimacy. By having large financial institutions promote
these funds and large law firms support the tax conclusions, investors do not
question whether or not they are legitimate. However, when one sees that
over $30 billion is invested in these funds, and considers the sophisticated
investor rules, it becomes apparent that the wealthy remain the only beneficiaries of these investments, and there is no tax in sight. These rules should
be reexamined.
Rather than following the Joint Committee on Taxation’s advice to
Representative Neal in his 1996 legislative proposal, and ignoring the problem because the rich will just find another way, there are two solutions to
the enigma of exchange funds. The first solution is to merely change the
rules in Sections 351 and 721 of the Code to prohibit the formation of these
exchange funds. The current laundry-list approach must be eliminated. The
ability of the financial markets to create security line instruments is unsurpassed. Congress and the treasury are unable to keep pace. Thus, the fundamental rules must be changed. Moreover, given the apparent misapplication of the underlying statutes, this does not appear to be an unreasonable
approach.
There is also an intermediate attack on the exchange funds. Treasury
can use the anti-abuse rules in Treasury Regulations Section 1.701-2 to prohibit the formation of these entities. There exists no apparent reason for the
current acquiescence to this structure. The stated purpose of the exchange
fund is to avoid taxation. Treasury should use the anti-abuse regulations to
prevent exchange funds from being solely formed for tax avoidance.

